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Abstract
This essay explores the process of teaching students—and ourselves—to listen to and accept different versions
of reality. Such exploration results in a proposition that is easy to state but difficult to accomplish: that in order
to achieve this goal, we must challenge the students' "common sense”—their sense that they "know" how
people act—by offering examples of behaviors that differ from that knowledge, without triggering the very
"common sense" we are trying to combat. Toward this end, the first section of the essay presents a
hypothetical initial interview with a client, and the student interviewer's reactions to her, which reflect the
student's "common sense" understanding about the lives of people like his client. The second section
compares the student's reactions to criticisms of the broader movement of "outsider narrative”, and concludes
that the two reactions emanate from the same failure to acknowledge and integrate differences between the
storyteller/client and the critic/student. The essay then explores the development of sexual harassment law to
demonstrate how outsider narrative can change laws by challenging the entrenched common sense of the fact
finder. Finally, the essay returns to the clinic and suggests having students read relevant fiction along with
other outsider narrative as a way to reach the students' common sense understanding before it gets in the way
of their ability to hear their clients' stories.
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Essay' 
A FIELD TRIP TO BENETTON 
AND BEYOND: 
SOME THOUGHTS ON 
"OUTSIDER NARRATIVE" 
IN A LAW SCHOOL CLINIC 
CAROLYN GROSE* 
One of the goals of clinicians as teachers is to train law students 
to listen to, hear and retell their clients' stories.1 This task is compli-
cated by the fact that the students - who are for the most part white 
and middle-class, and by definition college-educated2 - inhabit a 
world vastly different from - indeed some might say diametrically 
opposed to - the world inhabited by the clinic's client population, 
which generally tends to be poor people with a limited education, and 
for the most part people of color.3 
Given these differences, students' ability to hear and believe their 
clients' stories is often inhibited because those stories take place in 
and present a reality that not only diverges from, but also contradicts 
the students' own reality. The clinician's first challenge, therefore, is 
* 1996 Skadden Fellow, Western Massachusetts Legal Services, and Adjunct Clinical 
Professor, Western New England College School of Law; J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1994. 
I would like to thank June Bogen, Claudia Grose, Peter Grose, Minna Kotkin and Amy 
Yanni for their editorial comments and suggestions on various drafts of this essay; and Rick 
Glassman for helping me put theory into practice. 
1 See, e.g., Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in 
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REv. 485, 486 (1994) ("clinical theory has long grounded narra-
tive in the actual practice of lawyering"). See also Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: 
Developing a Clinical Perspective on Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of Clinical Education: Dilemmas 
and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 287 (1986); Ann Shalleck, Con-
structions of the Client Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1731,1748 (1993); Abbe 
Smith, Rosie O'Neil Goes to Law School: the Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age 
Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-c.L. REv. 1 (1993); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, 
"Here's What We Do": Some Notes About Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 
673 (1980); Symposium, The Many Voices of Clinical Legal Education, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 1 
(1994). 
2 Michael A. Olivas, Legal Norms in Law School Admissions: An Essay in Parallel 
Universes, 42 J. LEGAL Eouc. 103 (1992) (in 1991, 85% of all law students were white, 
while African Americans made up only 6.3% of the law student population, and other 
minorities made up an even smaller percentage). 
3 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE Pou-
TICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 45 (1990). 
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to train the students to be on the lookout for this dissonance, and, 
rather than reject the differences, to integrate them into their own 
understanding of what is true. 
This essay explores the process of teaching students - and our-
selves - to listen to and accept different versions of reality. Such 
exploration results in a proposition that is easy to state but difficult to 
accomplish: that in order to achieve this goal, we must challenge the 
students' "common sense" - their sense that they "know" how peo-
ple act - by offering examples of behaviors that differ from that 
knowledge, without triggering the very "common sense" we are trying 
to combat. 
Toward this end, the first section of the essay presents a hypothet-
ical initial interview with a client, and the student interviewer's reac-
tions to her, which reflect the student's "common sense" 
understanding about the lives of people like his client. The second 
section compares the student's reactions to criticisms of the broader 
movement of "outsider narrative,"4 and concludes that the two reac-
tions emanate from the same failure to acknowledge and integrate dif-
ferences between the storyteller/client and the critic/student. The 
essay then explores the development of sexual harassment law to 
demonstrate how outsider narrative can change laws by challenging 
4 I use the terms "outsider narrative" and "outsider jurisprudence" generally to de-
scribe a movement in legal literature and academia to incorporate the voices of "outsiders" 
into mainstream legal dialogue. By "outsider," I mean to describe someone who does not 
have access to the channels of power and communication in this society. Practically speak-
ing - and for the purposes of this article - this means someone who is female, of color, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, un/der educated, low-income, poor, disabled, undocumented, non-
English speaking, etc. Conversely, an "insider" is someone who does have access to the 
channels of power and communication in this society, i.e. a straight, white, educated, male 
American citizen. 
A crucial component of the movement is the telling of stories, often in the first person, 
often quite personal and "unlegal," about the author's life or experiences. See infra notes 
14-18 and accompanying text. Paul Gewirtz explains the movement - the "turn to narra-
tive" - as "a clear offshoot of the further loss of faith in the idea of objective truth and the 
widespread embrace of ideas about the social construction of reality." Introduction to 
LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 13 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz 
eds., 1996). 
The "outsider jurisprudence" or "outsider narrative" movement embraces many dif-
ferent theories and theorists, which it is beyond the scope of this essay to describe in great 
detail. For more analysis and exploration, see, e.g., Arthur Austin, A Primer on Decon-
struction's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays," 71 N.C. L. REV. 201, 230-31 (1992) (Critical Legal 
Studies' argument that political and class interests govern judicial decisionmaking). See 
also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
1-12 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The 
Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 
127-28 (1987) (all three Critical Race theorists using "outsider narrative" to expose how 
the law and society reinforce prejudice and discrimination). 
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the entrenched common sense of the fact-finder. Finally, the essay 
returns to the clinic and suggests having students read relevant fiction 
along with other outsider narrative as a way to reach the students' 
common sense understanding before it gets in the way of their ability 
to hear their clients' stories. 
"Marci's" Story 
Part of my job as a legal services attorney involves supervising 
law students who are participating in a Legal Services Clinic in our 
office. One of my tasks in this capacity is to discuss and analyze with 
the students their interviews of clients or potential clients. The follow-
ing is a hypothetical discussion with a student about a new client. It is 
hypothetical in that this client per se does not exist. Rather, the de-
scription of "Marci" represents an amalgamation of many clients the 
students in the Legal Services Clinic had interviewed and represented. 
The student, on the other hand, did really exist. Like the majority of 
his law school peers, he was a white, middle class straight man in his 
mid-twenties.5 His participation in the legal services clinic grew out of 
a personal and professional background of progressive politics, and a 
commitment to pursuing a career in public interest law. 
All we knew about this client before she came in was that she was 
a woman who needed help in a custody battle. The student prepared 
by going over the state custody, divorce and child support statutes, 
and by reading recent family law cases dealing with custody. Based on 
what he gleaned from these resources, he wrote out a list of areas he 
wanted to explore in the course of the interview, such as the relation-
ship between the child and the father; whether there was a history of 
substance abuse on either side; whether there were suggestions of sex-
ual or physical abuse on either side; what the child was like; what the 
child wanted; etc. 
In addition, the student read over the Binder, Bergman & Price6 
chapters on interviewing, and reminded himself to ask open-ended 
questions and let the client tell her own story before he jumped in. 
After some quick generic role-playing with me, the student went off to 
interview the client. 
About an hour later, he came into my office, visibly disturbed. I 
5 See supra note 2 (describing the statistical make-up of a law school student body). 
6 DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: 
A CLIENT-CENTERED ApPROACH (1991). This textbook is commonly used in law school 
clinics to help students develop the practical skills of representing clients who are, for the 
most part, low-income or otherwise "outsiders." See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Critical 
Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REv. 697 (1992) (book review essay of BINDER, BERG-
MAN & PRICE, supra, and ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEW-
ING, COUNSELING AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990». 
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could tell the interview had not gone as he had expected. "What hap-
pened?" I asked. 
"Well, the client, Marci, is a lesbian who claims she was battered 
by her lesbian lover, Pam, who is now in jail for attempted murder. 
Marci herself was acquitted of criminal negligence for having allowed 
Pam's five year old son, Clint, fall out a second story window, suppos-
edly because Marci was protecting him from Pam. Clint is fine, but 
Pam's parents are now suing for custody of Clint, who is currently in 
foster care, and whom Marci refers to as 'my son.' She came here 
because she wants us to represent her in the custody case." 
"And?" I asked. 
"Well, I'm having trouble putting the story together in a way that 
makes sense. I mean I like her. And I definitely feel bad for her, 
she's been through a horrible ordeal. But I don't know legally what 
we can or should do for her. I can't make sense of her story. 
First, I can't really digest the idea of a woman beating up her own 
son and female lover. Second, Clint isn't Marci's child. She had no 
biological or legal connection to him. She and Pam didn't even have a 
formal agreement between them - no signed document or contract 
that could show the intent of the parties that Marci be considered the 
other parent. I don't know. I tend to think that either the dad -
depending on who he is in the equation - or Pam's parents have 
more of a claim here than Marci. 
Not to mention the whole question of unfitness - what person 
who considered herself a caring maternal figure would let a five year 
old - no, put a five year old - on a window sill without regard to 
whether or not he would fall out and probably die? I'll grant that 
maybe she didn't do it intentionally, but the fact that she did it at all 
makes me think either that she really doesn't care about Clint the way 
she says she does, or that, if she does, she is nonetheless not fit to be a 
parent." 
"So," I asked, "are you uncomfortable with Marci because you 
don't believe her, or because you don't believe in her? You don't feel 
her to be a 'worthy' - for lack of a better word - client?" 
"I guess both. First, I don't believe parts of her story. But you're 
right. Even if I dId believe her completely, I don't know if I would 
think she was someone we should represent. Forget about whether or 
not we would win - and I don't think we would stand a chance -
what message would we be sending? That legal services defends lesbi-
ans with no biological connection to a child, and who let that child fall 
out a third story window, in custody battles against that child's own 
maternal grandparents? And what lessons am I learning by represent-
ing such a client?" 
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The student couldn't accept Marci's version of events. And he 
further couldn't make sense of trying to accept her version of events. 
He could draw no redeeming normative conclusions from her case, 
either for society as a whole or for his own growth as a law student or 
lawyer. He wanted no part of Marci's case. 
I, on the other hand, trusted Marci and believed her story. I 
thought her situation was an interesting and difficult one with great 
ramifications for non-biological mothers and for women in violent re-
lationships with other women. But then, I was a lesbian who had ex-
perience both with non-biological mothers and with lesbians in violent 
relationships. I knew about these things from my life. In contrast, the 
student - the straight white middle-class male student - had not had 
experience with lesbians as mothers, let alone in violent relationships. 
He did not have the same background resources that I did to help him 
identify with and understand this client. 
How could I impart to him my sense that Marci was telling the 
truth, that her version of events was not only possible but probable, 
that her case was a worthy one? I couldn't do it without sounding 
hysterical or preachy or both. And anyway, the point was for students 
to come to these conclusions themselves, not to have me lecture them 
until they got it. 
We agreed that he would do some research into custody disputes 
involving women iIi prison, and non-biological parents. But I wasn't 
satisfied. The student wasn't going to find answers to his concerns in 
one or two family law decisions. His concerns went much deeper than 
whether or not Marci's behavior was covered by a particular case or 
statute. He was concerned because he had been unable to hear 
Marci's story. He had done all the right things in preparation. He had 
been open-minded from the outset. He had let her tell the story. The 
interview had been a perfect exercise in client-centered interviewing.7 
And yet, he did not feel comfortable representing Marci because 
her story didn't ring true, it didn't make sense to him, he couldn't 
integrate it into his own views of the world. Without being able to 
hear Marci's story on some deeper level, not just as a string of facts, 
he felt unable to mold it into a viable case theory8 and prepare to 
present that theory to a judge or jury. What's more, Marci's story 
7 For discussions of the importance of "client-centeredness," see generally BASTRESS & 
HARBAUGH, supra note 6; BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note 6; Miller, supra note 1, 
at 503-13. 
8 For discussion of the central role of case theory in the preparation and presentation 
of the client's "legal story" to a decisionmaker, see, e.g., RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD 
J. IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRAcnCE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS § 3.2 (2d 
ed. 1995). See also Miller, supra note 1, at 490-529 (describing different approaches to 
building case theory). 
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confirmed his own privileged understanding of the world - a world in 
which lesbian relationships are outside the norm and women with no 
biological connection to kids have no stake in taking care of them. He 
felt unable to represent her because on som~ level he didn't believe 
she deserved to be represented. 
Outsider Narrative and its Critics 
As I floundered around, trying to find the magic formula that 
would crack Marci's code for this student, I suddenly realized the par-
allels between my interactions with the student and the scholarly de-
bates over "outsider narrative."9 The student's rejection of Marci's 
story mirrored the rejection of Patricia Williams' "Benetton Story"l0 
by critics like Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherryll and Kathryn 
Abrams.12 My student was a critic of outsider narrativeP The key, 
then, to getting him to understand Marci would be to deconstruct his 
criticism of Marci's story in the same way that defenders of outsider 
narrative deconstruct their critics. 
Susan Estrich begins a law review article on rape with a brutal 
description of her own violation.14 Marie Ashe takes readers through 
four births, several miscarriages and an abortion to bring her point 
home about the need for reform in reproductive health laws.IS Patri-
cia Williams recounts how it feels to be discriminated against by 
describing a routine Christmas shopping expedition gone awry.16 
These are the voices ·of outsiders, telling their storiesP 
In particular, I thought of the debates generated by Patricia Wil-
liams' "Benetton Story."18 In the story, Patricia Williams describes 
9 See supra note 4 (defining "outsider narrative" and "outsider jurisprudence"). 
10 See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
11 Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on 
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993). 
12 Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991). 
13 See infra note 17 and sources cited therein. 
14 Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). 
15 Marie Ashe, Zig Zag Stitching and the Seamless Web: Thoughts on "Reproduction" 
and the Law, in NARRATIVE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 262-87 (David R. Papke, ed., 1991). 
16 See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
17 It is beyond the scope of this article to give an exhaustive recitation or analysis of the 
body of "outsider narrative" or its critics. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 
GEO. L.J. 2475 (1993); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber 
and Sherry, 46 V AND. L. REv. 665 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 
STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving 
Content to the Voice of Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholar-
ship, 79 IOWA L. REV. 803 (1994); and sources cited supra notes 4,11-16 and accompany-
ing text, and infra notes 18, 27, 29, 33, 47 and accompanying text. 
18 PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1991) ("The 
Death of the Profane: a commentary on the genre of legal writing") (hereafter "the Benet-
ton story"). 
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going Christmas shopping for her mother. She sees a sweater she 
thinks will be perfect in the window of a Benetton store. She sees 
several white shoppers inside the store, so rings the buzzer to be let in, 
pressing her "round brown face" against the window while she does 
so. The young, white salesclerk, blowing a bubble with his gum, 
shakes his head "no," and indicates that the store is closed. He will 
not let her in. She writes of this experience and sends the article in to 
be published in a law review, where it undergoes various radical trans-
formations,19 which she also describes in the final essay. 
Critics responded to the Benetton story by asking if Williams was 
"not using the store window as a 'metaphorical fence' against the po-
tential of [the salesman's] explanation in order to represent [her] side 
as 'authentic"';20 and by wondering how she could be sure she was 
right. In classrooms, the discussion of the Benetton story often fo-
cuses not on what the story tells us about racism or the experience of 
being an African American woman, but on whether what Williams 
described "really happened. "21 Indeed, a concern common to most 
critics of "outsider narrative" is exactly the same concern as that ex-
pressed by the student, an insider, about the story that Marci, an out-
sider, told: Why should we believe this story?22 
The student's other major concern was also one present in much 
criticism of outsider narrative scholarship, which is the question of au-
thority: Why are these stories important enough for us to take seri-
ously?23 Or, as the student asked, what message do we send, what 
19 See, e.g., id. at 57 (describing a conversation Williams had with one of her law review 
editors). 
20 [d. at 51. 
21 Indeed, part of the story itself is Williams' description of a conversation she had with 
one of her law review editors: 
I received the second edit. All reference to Benetton had been deleted because, 
according to the editors and the faculty advisor, it was defamatory; they feared har-
assment and liability; they said printing it would be irresponsible. I called them and 
offered to supply a footnote attesting to this as my personal experience at one partic-
ular location and of a buzzer system not limited to Benetton's; the editors told me 
that they were not in the habit of publishing things that were unverifiable. I could 
not but wonder, in this refusal even to let me file an affidavit, what it would take to 
make my experience verifiable. 
[d. at 57. 
22 See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, supra note 11; Mark Thshnet, The Degradation of Consti-
tutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251 (1992). See Marc A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and 
Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 
1845 (1994) for a critique of these articles. 
23 See Farber & Sherry, supra note 11, at 824-27, 831-40. Kathryn Abrams complains 
that often in these outsider narratives, 
Despite the professed intentions of [the] authors, [the story] does not help [readers] 
think about ameliorative legal reforms .... The experience conveyed by the narrative 
does not seem to translate automatically into a new rule; and the narrative scholar-
ship seems to provide no "normative framework" for achieving that translation. 
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lesson do we teach, if we accept this story as true? Both are unable to 
make the leap from the story itself - a description of something that 
happened to someone - to an action.24 
Williams describes her experience with the publication of her 
Benetton story: 
Two days after the piece was sent to press, I received copies of the 
final page proofs. All reference to my race had been eliminated 
because it was against "editorial policy" to permit descriptions of 
physiognomy .... In a telephone conversation to them, I ranted 
wildly about the significance of such an omission. "It's irrelevant," 
another editor explained .... "It's nice and poetic," but it doesn't 
"advance the discussion of any principle .... This is a law review, 
after all. "25 
The editors could not make the leap from Williams' description of her 
"round brown face" pressed up against the store window, to a broader 
discussion of the racism underlying the buzzer security systems in New 
York. So too, the student could not make the leap from Marci's de-
scription of mothering Clint while Pam drank and battered to a 
broader discussion of alternative family and domestic violence. 
The criticism of "outsider narrative" and the student's rejection 
of Marci's story share two basic flaws. First, they rely on definitions of 
legal norms and values that fail to reflect the reality of outsiders' lives, 
the exact norms and values these stories challenge. Second, the sup-
posedly objective standard of truth on which the criticisms rely is in 
fact just one - albeit the dominant - point of view, so is no more 
inherently valuable than the storyteller'S point of view. In short, these 
criticisms ignore the fact that outsider narratives grow out of a context 
of their own, that is by definition different from insiders' reality.26 
Critics suggest that these narrative, highly personalized and spe-
cific stories do not fit in to the legal framework of verifiable truths 
that creates new legal principles. In other words, these stories de-
scribe events and people that don't necessarily have a place "inside" 
mainstream legal discourse, using language and structure that lead to 
no normative legal conclusions. However, as Jane E. Baron points 
out, 
the notion that storytellers must justify departures from "the rules" 
of mainstream scholarship "as they exist," as well as from the "ordi-
Abrams; supra note 12, at 978. 
24 See, e.g., Thshnet, supra note 22, at 252-60 (expressing concern that outsider narra-
tive, focusing as it does on the individual's experience, doesn't relate well enough to gen-
eral legal principles). 
25 WILLIAMS, supra note 18, at 47. 
26 Fajer, supra note 22, at 1845 (these critics "fail to consider that outsider narratives do 
not take place in a vacuum"). 
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nary understanding" or the "conventional standard" of truth ... [is] 
precisely what many storytellers dispute, namely, that mainstream, 
ordinary, and conventional standards are just "there" and them-
selves already justified.27 
117 
Put more simply, by Gertrude Stein, "there is no there there."28 The 
"there" is the power of the insiders to have their stories believed by 
others like themselves, and thus transformed into official stories. 
Insiders have created and perpetuated their own reality, from 
which outsiders are, by definition, excluded, leaving, as Kim Lane 
Scheppele describes, "those whose stories are not believed [to] live in 
a legally sanctioned 'reality' that does not match their perceptions. "29 
The law review editor's reality - a world where race is nothing more 
than a "description[ ] of physiognomy" - has nothing to do with Wil-
liams' reality as an African American woman denied access to the in-
sider - of a Benetton store, of the world of legal scholarship -
because of her race. So too, the student's reality in which biology de-
termines relationships, and women don't let kids fall out windows has 
nothing to do with the reality of a battered lesbian desperately trying 
to protect her son from their batterer. 
These divergent realities are most explicitly reflected by the criti-
cisms that the stories provide no tools with which to leap from their 
descriptive narratives to a legal principle or conclusion. Probing 
slightly deeper into these stories reveals not that they express no nor-
mative values, but rather that they describe and represent normative 
values that are different from the insider's. 
Critics ask: Did Williams correctly interpret the salesclerk's re-
fusal to let her in as racism? Is this the inference that I, as an insider, 
would have drawn? The student asked: Would I have stayed with a 
partner who beat me? Would I have put Clint on the windowsill? The 
answer to these questions is generally no, because the insiders asking 
these questions live in a world that is totally different from the world 
in which the outsiders live. Why, then, should those realities - the 
ones that are legally sanctioned by others who share them - deter-
mine the value of descriptions of the other realities - the ones re-
jected and distrusted by those who do not share them? 
Insiders respond that their realities are legally sanctioned not be-
cause they are believed by other insiders, but because they represent 
an objective, neutral expression of truth. The stories of outsiders, on 
the other hand, represent a particular point of view - whether of a 
27 Jane E. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994). 
28 GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY's AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937) (describing her 
hometown of Oakland, California). 
29 Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2079 (1989). 
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lesbian, or of a non-biological mother, or of a VIctim of domestic 
abuse, or of an African-American woman. As such, they are inher-
ently less reliable than the neutral, objective theory of truth. 
But again, where is the "there"? Really, the insider's "neutral, 
objective" account of what happened is only one version of many pos-
sible accounts, each representative of the teller's own point of view, 
which in this case is that of a white straight upper-middle class pro-
gressive law student. This begs the question, posed here by Kim 
Scheppele, "if the objectivist account is one point of view among 
many (and not the point-of-viewless as against other point-of-viewful 
accounts), why ... should [it] be privileged?"30 Clearly, it shouldn't. 
Rather, it should be measured for what it is: one of several possible 
points of view, not inherently more, not inherently less valuable than 
any other point of view. 
So having de constructed the official reasons for dismissing outsid-
ers' stories both from the realm of "serious legal scholarship" and the 
realm of "what really happened," we must now ask, what is really go-
ing on? Insiders refuse to hear and/or believe outsiders' stories31 be-
cause they often conflict with the insider's understanding of the 
outsider. The essential message these storytellers send is "not that 
judgment and evaluation [of the stories] are impossible, but that these 
processes take place against a backdrop of hidden, contestable as-
sumptions without which we could never function, but which necessar-
ily predetermine in large measure, the results reached."32 
This backdrop of assumptions has also been called "stereotypes," 
"background stories," and the term that I will use for now, "pre-un-
derstanding."33 Basically, pre-understanding means that the readers 
or listeners who are insiders pass the outsiders' stories through a pre-
existing screen of "knowledge" about how such outsiders act. Be-
cause the outsiders' stories often conflict with that pre-existing 
"knowledge," a tension arises between what the insiders "know" 
about the outsiders and what the outsiders' stories are describing. 
Confronted with this tension, insiders often choose not to question 
their own version of reality - what they "know" is "true" - but 
rather to reject the conflicting story as inherently false. 34 
30 Id. at 2091. 
31 Id. at 2079 (describing how outsider narratives are "officially distrusted, rejected, 
found to be untrue, or perhaps not heard at all"). 
32 Baron, supra note 27, at 257. 
33 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons 
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107, 2123-24 (1991); Fajer, supra note 22, at 1845; Marc 
A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, 
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511 (1992). 
34 Fajer, supra note 22, at 1856 ("Faced with a conflict between deep-seated beliefs and 
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The white salesman in the Benetton store couldn't imagine that 
Williams wanted to come in to buy because his pre-understanding 
about African Americans was that they came in to steaL The law re-
view editors couldn't see this as racism because it was done "with a 
smile, a handshake, and a shrug," and their pre-understanding of ra-
cism was that it was done with firehoses and police dogs. The student 
couldn't believe that Pam really beat up Marci because his pre-under-
standing of relationships was that people leave when they are being 
hurt; nor could he believe that Marci was Clint's mother because she 
had no biological connection to him and my student's pre-understand-
ing was that blood is thicker than water. 
Overcoming Pre-understanding: Some Success Stories 
Pre-understanding is problematic not only because it prevents in-
siders from appreciating the stories of outsiders on an intellectual 
level, but also because "the pre-understanding of judges and lawyers 
can infect the legal process and build incorrect or overbroad assump-
tions into the structure of laws and legal decisions."35 In other words, 
not only do readers reject these stories, but judges and juries and, as I 
saw, students being trained as legal services attorneys do too. 
Another term for pre-understanding is the one I used in the be-
ginning of this essay: "common sense." Judges almost always admon-
ish juries "not to leave your common sense outside the jury room." 
Indeed, common sense is much of the reason behind our jury system 
- if we didn't want the common understanding of the community to 
influence the outcomes of cases, we would let the judge decide the 
case. So when a fact-finder's common sense tells him or her that peo-
ple don't act the way the plaintiffs or defendants in this case acted, he 
or she is likely to reject that plaintiff's or defendant's story. The fact-
finder cannot integrate these stories into his or her understanding of 
the world. 
In order to overcome the pre-understanding of the fact-finder 
when representing an "outsider," lawyers must work to integrate the 
outsider stories into the common sense of insiders. This process re-
quires a delicate balance. The attorney must identify what pre-under-
a contradicting story, some people may adjust their beliefs, but others are likely to reject 
the story as untrue."). See also Baron, supra note 27, at 263 ("Background assumptions 
determine, in great measure, whether a particular account will be heard as a ... persuasive 
or believable story"); Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. 
L.J. 313, 323 (1992). 
35 Fajer, supra note 22, at 1847. See also Scheppele, supra note 29, at 2098 ("Courts can 
exacerbate and reinforce the differences and disagreements that invariably exist in a plural-
istic society by clinging to the views that there is only one true version of a story and that 
there is only one right way to tell it."). 
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standing exists and offer an alternative to that pre-understanding, 
without losing the fact-finder by challenging his or her common sense 
to such an extent as to trigger the "I don't believe you" impulse. 
Generally, the best way to do this is by telling counterstories 
about an individual member of the "outsider" group. As Marc Fajer 
explains, "stories about individuals are a particularly useful way to 
combat pre-understanding .... Because pre-understanding often con-
sists of gross over-generalizations, it may be effectively combatted or 
mediated through counterexamples. "36 
An example of how this works is the now well-established cause 
of action for sexual harassment. Before Catharine MacKinnon con-
vinced everyone that sexual harassment was gender discrimination, 
"the facts that amount to sexual harassment did not amount to sexual 
harassment. "37 The common sense understanding of the behavior that 
came to be known as sexual harassment - the teasing and flirting and 
dirty joke telling - was that "boys will be boys," that this behavior 
was biological, and that men couldn't help doing it.38 
By the same token, women who complained about this "natural 
male" behavior were dismissed as humorless, rigid, and oversensitive. 
"Not that the acts did not occur, but rather that it was unreasonable to 
experience them as harmful. Such a harm would be based not on sex 
but on individual hysteria."39 
One judge in an early case held that the defendant's attempts to 
"go out" with the plaintiff, and his repeated questions along the lines 
of "what am I going to get for this?" were "capable of innocent inter-
pretation,"40 despite the plaintiff's testimony that such behavior was 
"hateful, dangerous and damaging."41 Another early case before the 
EEOC held that if a victim was sexually harassed without a cor-
roborating witness, proof was inadequate as a matter of law.42 This 
woman's story was legally not enough to overcome what the judge 
36 Fajer, supra note 22, at 1847. In addition, counterstories are important to show the 
kinds of stereotypes and pre-understanding that exist: 
we can tell stories about ourselves, not so much to show how we are representative 
of our group, but how the society makes essentializing assumptions about us because 
of the groups to which we belong. These stories do not purport to show that all 
members of the group behave a certain way. Instead, they demonstrate that people 
commonly believe members of a group conform to the stereotype or at least that the 
relationship between the stereotype and reality is complex. 
Id. at 1854. 
37 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW 106 (1987). 
38 Id. at 108. 
39Id. 
40 Scott v. Sears & Roebuck, 605 F.Supp. 1047, 1051, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
41 MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 109. 
42 EEOC Decision 82-13, 29 FEP Cases 1855 (1982). 
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"knew" to be true about sexual harassment - i.e. that it doesn't 
happen. 
But beginning with her groundbreaking work, Sexual Harassment 
of Working Women,43 Mac~nnon told story after story about how 
this behavior made women feel, how it affected their productivity, 
how it played into their understanding of themselves in the work-
place.44 By presenting stories about individuals, MacKinnon exposed 
the gross generalizations inherent in the rationalizations for why the 
behavior that has come to be called sexual harassment was perfectly 
acceptable. In so doing, she appealed to the fact-finders' common 
sense by asking "are all men really animals with uncontrollable bio-
logical urges?" "Are all women who complain about those biological 
urges really uptight prudes?" 
Fact-finders began questioning their pre-understanding of what 
was acceptable male behavior; their common sense began to change. 
The first cases establishing sexual harassment as a cause of action 
under Title VII quoted extensively from MacKinnon's work, particu-
larly her descriptions of the harm the "boys will be boys" behavior 
caused to women.45 
Not only that, but, as MacKinnon declared triumphantly ten 
years after the first case was litigated, "once it became possible to do 
something about sexual harassment, it became possible to know more 
about it, because it became possible for its victims to speak about 
it."46 More stories could be told because they were now being heard. 
And they were being heard because the smokescreen of pre-under-
standing, stereotype, "common sense" had been, if not cleared away, 
at least punctured.47 
The "Disorienting Moments" 
It is not necessary, however, to wait until a case or client gets to a 
judge or jury to start challenging the "fact-finder's" pre-understand-
43 CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979). 
44 [d. at 25-55. 
45 See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.37 (D.C. Cir.) affd & remanded sub 
nom. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,945-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Mitchell v. OsAIR, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986). 
46 MacKinnon, supra note 37, at 106. 
47 In a recent essay, MacKinnon wrote: 
I have no idea why 85 percent of federal workers can be known to be sexually 
harassed for a decade, but not until one of them embodies the experience on na-
tional television does sexual harassment in the federal work force become real in 
some sense. 
Catharine MacKinnon, Law's Story as Reality and Politics, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE 
AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 4, at 237. 
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ing. Indeed, unless the pre-understanding of the attorney - and, by 
definition, the law student - is challenged early on, certain clients' 
cases won't ever get to a judge or a jury. Their stories will be rejected 
as untrue or unworthy. As we saw, Marci's story was doomed before 
she had even begun to tell it to the Legal Services student. This was 
so not because the student interviewing her had no interest in repre-
senting her, or meant not to believe her, but because her story did not 
comport with his common sense about how the world worked. 
So the counterstory-telling must begin at the beginning. A per-
fect place for such counterstories is in a law school clinic. As clini-
cians and practitioners of poverty law we strive for those times when 
our students or our colleagues or we ourselves are able to identify and 
challenge a stereotype and thereby more fully understand a broader 
scheme of injustice or inequity. In her piece in this issue, Jane Aiken 
describes these times as "disorienting moments," which Fran Quigley 
defines as moments 
"when the learner confronts an experience that is disorienting or 
even disturbing because the experience cannot be easily explained 
by reference to the leamer's prior understanding . . . of how the 
world works. "48 
But how do we do get to these moments, to what Aiken describes 
as opportunities for "major transformation?"49 How do we challenge 
the "common sense" of the students - who are "insiders" - so they 
can be effective advocates for their clients - who are "outsiders?" 
Aiken suggests that a law school clinic where students deal with 
real clients provides a perfect opportunity for these disorienting mo-
ments to occur. In a clinic, students come face to face with their privi-
lege and their client's lack thereof.5o It is within the disorienting 
moments created by this stark contrast that the student's common 
sense is challenged and she comes to "understand" the different real-
ity her client is describing. 51 
Marci's story brought the conscientious and well-intentioned 
straight white male law student face to face with his common sense 
about family violence and familial relationships. He had lived much 
of his life taking for granted not only that biology did govern the rules 
of family interaction, but that biology should do so. He was forced, 
after hearing Marci's story, to acknowledge at the very least that she 
48 Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach "Justice, Fairness, and Morality," 4 CLIN. L. 
REv. 1,24 (1997) (quoting Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 
37, 51 (1995)). 
49 Id. at 23. 
50 See supra notes 2, 3, 5 and accompanying text (describing race and class differences 
between law students and their clients). 
51 Aiken, supra note at 48, at 26. 
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presented a reality different from his, and one that he had probably 
never considered possible. This was the start of the disorienting 
moment. 
The key, however, is the next step - what he will choose to do 
with the clash of realities. For Aiken acknowledges that these "disori-
enting moments" can also become "confirming 'moments,"52 where 
the student's pre-understanding of his or her client - the pre-under-
standing that comes with the student's privilege - becomes con-
firmed by the client's story. 53 As we saw in both the student's reaction 
to Marci and the critics' reaction to Patricia Williams, "stories chal-
lenging the pre-understandings of the dominant culture will frequently 
raise credibility questions."54 They will, in other words, trigger, rather 
than challenge the "I don't believe you" reflex. 
Aiken finds that disorienting moments become confirming mo-
ments when the student remains detached from the client, unwilling to 
identify with her, and when, therefore, there remains a distinct power 
differential between the client and student.55 Aiken finds it difficult to 
prevent these confirming moments from happening because her at-
tempts to get students to examine their privilege are viewed "as high-
handed and 'politically correct,"'56 and might serve only to entrench 
the students' already entrenched notions of how people (should) act. 
This was my concern exactly as I tried to figure out how to get my 
student through what threatened to become a confirming experience 
to the disorienting experience I felt his exploration of Marci's story 
would offer. I needed a tool to ease my student's learning curve, a 
way to challenge.his pre-understanding without further entrenching it. 
How can clinicians provide students with the tools to prepare for 
an interview with someone whose story is so different from their own 
that it won't appear on their radar screen? How do we provide them 
the opportunity to hear their clients' stories before they hear directly 
from their clients, thereby allowing discussion and analysis of the sto-
52 [d. at 27. 
53 Jane Aiken describes her worst fears realized by students who lack compassion for 
their clients because those clients' stories merely reinforce the students' stereotypes about 
poor people and people of color: 
[d. 
In the clinic, we hear: "He's malingering .... " "She's always late or misses the 
appointment. She must not think of this as important .... " "She doesn't know how 
to raise her children." "I told him to keep all of his records but he just doesn't 
listen." "She doesn't deserve .... " "I'm not sure if he did this, but he did other 
things. Prison would be good for him." "Those people just don't know how to take 
care of their homes." 
54 Fajer, supra note 22, at 1863. 
55 Aiken, supra note 48, at 27-28. 
56 [d. at 27 & n.97 (citing Robert Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School 
Clinic and Political Critique, 35 J. LEGAL Eouc. 45 (1986)). 
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ries and the students' reactions to them, before the actual client gets 
rejected? 
Having students read outsider narrative might be a way. As we 
saw earlier, critics of these narratives had the same response to the 
stories that my student did to Marci's. Both narratives triggered the 
insiders' "I don't believe you" impulse which leads to an inability or 
refusal to hear the narratives. If they read these stories before hearing 
a real live client tell her story, the students would have the opportu-
nity both to experience the disbelief and also to examine the pre-un-
derstanding that causes the disbelief. 
For example, students in a Civil Rights Clinic could read the 
Benetton Story and spend an entire class discussing whether Williams' 
story was "true" and why. The clinician could guide the discussion so 
that students on their own would come to identify the backdrop of 
privilege and stereotype that prevented them from believing Williams' 
story. In this way, the clinician could control against confirming mo-
ments and help the students themselves transform these occasions into 
the disorienting moments that lead to understanding and compassion. 
Then, when a real live client complaining of discriminatory treatment 
comes in, the students would be prepared with a new filter to hear her 
story. 
But outsider narrative is· not confined to the nonfiction pieces 
that are starting to pepper legal academic journals. Indeed, a much 
more common form of outsider narrative appears outside the acad-
emy and outside the law: It is called fiction. 
When we read fiction, we suspend our disbelief. We understand 
that the people who are acting so differently from how we in these 
situations would act are fictional characters, so we are able to feel 
compassion for them. We are able to see their world and hear their 
stories without rejecting it and them as implausible. 
The student didn't believe that a woman would beat up her own 
child and female lover. In Another Mother, by Ruthann Robson, the 
protagonist, a lesbian attorney, represents lesbians who are accused of 
killing their children. 57 
The student was unwilling to view Marci as Clint's mother be-
cause she had no biological connection to him. As such, he felt that 
Pam's parents, who were Clint's biological grandparents, would be 
better caretakers. In the novel Mothers, by Jax Peters Lowell,58 two 
women have a baby together, using the brother of the non-biological 
mother as the sperm donor. The parents of the non-biological mother 
- who, through their son, are the biological grandparents of the child 
57 RUTHANN ROBSON, ANOTHER MOTHER (1995). 
58 lAX PETERS LOWELL, MOTIlERS (1995). 
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- sue for custody of the child because of the biological mother's 
lesbianism. 
The student didn't believe a mother would let her child fall out of 
a window in order to protect him from being battered. The central 
and brutal scene in Toni Morrison's Beloved describes how Sethe, a 
former slave, cut her infant daughter's throat when she knew that 
white men were coming to take her and her children into slavery.59 
These are examples relevant to Marci's particular case, but out-
sider voices in modern and not so modern literature reflect the lives of 
most if not all legal services clients. 
Dorothy Allison's novel and stories on the lives of impoverished 
southern families would go far in dispelling the stereotypes of law stu-
dents working in a rural poverty law clinic, or in a family law clinic 
dealing with the victims of domestic and/or child abuse.60 
Paul Monette's and Larry Kramer's descriptions of gay life begin-
ning in the early days of the AIDS epidemic up to today would be a 
useful addition to the curriculum of an HIV/AIDS law clinic, where 
the common sense of students might be that all gay men now (should) 
use condoms and practice safe sex.61 
The poignant climax of Gloria Naylor's "Mattie Michael" in 
Women of Brewster Place involves an African American mother's de-
cision to put her house - her only asset - up for bail so that her only 
son can get out of jail.62 Understanding the protagonist's motivation 
in making this decision, which results in disaster, would be essential 
for students in a criminal defense clinic. Though typically such stu-
dents would be representing the son in jail, not the mother, any kind 
of "client-centered" lawyering, particularly in the criminal context, 
would have to take into account the needs and experience of the cli-
ent's family. 
These books are novels. The readers implicitly agree to withhold 
judgment, and are drawn into the horror and tragedy of the custody 
fight, slavery, child abuse. If the authors do their jobs, the readers 
come out on the side of the protagonist. The point of fiction is not to 
convince the reader that the actions of the characters are necessarily 
right and must be defended at all costs. Rather, the point is to shed 
light on the characters' motivation, and thus to challenge the reader's 
assumptions about and understanding of what makes people do what 
59 TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 148-53 (1988). 
60 See, e.g., DOROTHY ALLISON, BASTARD OUT OF CAROLINA (1992); DOROTHY AL-
LISON, TRASH (1988). 
61 See, e.g., PAUL MONETTE, HALFWAY HOME (1991); PAUL MONETTE, AFTERLIFE 
(1990); LARRY KRAMER, THE NORMAL HEART (1985). 
62 GLORIA NAYLOR, THE WOMEN OF BREWSTER PLACE, A NOVEL IN SEVEN STORIES 
7-54 (1980) 
HeinOnline -- 4 Clinical L. Rev. 126 1997-1998
126 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:109 
they do. . 
Had the student read these works before meeting with Marci, he 
might have been prepared to hear - and believe - her despair about 
losing Clint. He might have been prepared to question the right of 
Pam's parents to sue for custody. He might have had some insight 
into why Marci put Clint on the windowsill. He might not have been 
so quick to reject her story as impossible. And he might have seen 
that the lesson to be learned - the normative conclusion to be 
reached - from representing a client like Marci, from telling Marci's 
story to a judge, was not that lesbians who try to kill their lover's child 
deserve custody of that child, but rather that the notion of family is 
evolving and complicated, and that laws must accommodate that 
evolution. 
Jane Aiken describes a "successful" disorienting moment that re-
sults from a student's experience with a gay HIV ~positive male client 
who reminds the student of her uncle, who is straight.63 Short of hav-
ing Marci remind the student of his aunt or sister or mother, it seems 
that these fictional stories provide the greatest tool for overcoming 
the student's inability to hear Marci's story. 
Being a lawyer is about representing people: asking questions 
that elicit stories that we can hear and understand and retell. To be 
able to ask those questions and hear and retell those stories, we must 
learn to understand human motivation that is different from our own. 
By having law students read fiction - in conjunction with their case 
books and their Binder, Bergman and Price and their journal articles 
- we remind them that different realities result in and from different 
motivations, and we remind them to be compassionate in the face of 
that difference. 
Conclusion 
In response to an early draft of this paper, someone asked me, 
"do you really think that Justice Kennedy wrote the Romer v. Evans64 
opinion as a result of having read modern gay fiction?" While this is 
certainly a nice image to contemplate, it is an oversimplification. 
Fact-finders on all levels - whether they be law students or juries 
or judges - are influenced by what they see and hear in their own 
63 See Aiken, supra note 48, at 39. 
64 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The Supreme Court in this case upheld an injunction entered 
by the Denver, Colorado District Court, and upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court, en-
joining enforcement of an amendment to the Colorado Constitution ("Amendment 2") 
prohibiting all legislative, executive or judicial action designed to protect homosexual per-
sons from discrimination. In what was hailed as a landmark case for gay rights, Justice 
Kennedy wrote the opinion holding that Amendment 2 violated the U.S. Constitution's 
Equal Protection Clause. . 
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lives. Part of what they see and hear is fiction: movies, television, 
novels, plays. The more present the stories of outsiders are in the 
fiction that fact-finders see and hear, the more likely those fact-finders 
are to accept the outsiders' stories when they see and hear those in 
real life. 
I don't know why Justice Kennedy wrote the Romer opinion the 
way he did, any more than I know why Justice White wrote the Hard-
wick opinion the way he did.65 However, I don't think it's a stretch to 
say that the change in society's views about homosexuality over the 
ten years that elapsed between the two opinions played a role. I fur-
ther don't think it's a stretch to say that a catalyst to those changing 
societal views about homosexuality is the increased presence of gay 
themes in fiction. So, in a manner of speaking, you could say that at 
least part of the reason Justice Kennedy wrote the Romer opinion the 
way he did is that he read modern gay fiction. Or at least his law clerk 
had. 
65 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the case in which the Supreme Court held 
that the U.S. Constitution's guarantee to the right of privacy did not encompass "homosex-
ual sodomy." 
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